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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
Appeal from a Judgment 
Of the Third Judicial Di 
Case 
Of Salt Lake County, Utah~ ', 
Honorable Peter L. Le•rf'• · · 
Harry o. Pugsley 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
•ttorney for 
· . Defendant and Respondent 
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POINT I 
THE FACT THAT THE WINEGARS RECEIVED THE 
LEASE BY AN ASSIGNMENT DOES NOT 
CURE TIIE AMBIGUITY CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT 
The major thrust of defendant's fourth point in its 
brief is that the ambiguity in the lease is cured by the 
assignment of the amended lease from the Doxeys to the 
winegars. A review of the proceedings in the trial court 
clearly shows that the decision of the trial judge is 
primarily influenced by the court's concern that the assign-
ment of the lease should now preclude the existence of 
an ambiguous term in the agreement. At page 243 of the 
record the trial judge stated: 
--my question goes No. 1, you're 
claiming that there's an ambiguity, 
and it's between the parties, and 
that needs to be straightened around. 
Well, the parties to the amendment 
were Mr. Doxey and Smith Investment 
Company. The people that came in 
subsequently were not parties to 
the amendment. They took an assignment 
of the lease. If they take an 
assignment of the lease, don't they 
take subject to whatever the terms 
and conditions of that lease are? 
And if so, if they have read the 
lease, then where is there any 
ambiguity between the parties? 
After all, the--really the assignees 
are not parties to the lease in 
the sense that you're talking about. 
They're taking an interest of someone 
else under the terms of the lease. 
Now, how do you get the ambiguity 
down to the plaintiff? 
-1-
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The trial court was not justified in relying upon 
the assignment of the lease as being an exception to the 
rule that a court must properly construe an ambiguous 
provision of a lease. In its brief, the defendant fails 
to cite any legal authority for such " pos:i tion. i\ftor 
deligent research, the plaintiffs assert thctt there is 
none. 
Case law is frequently cited to the effect that 
an assignee has no greater rights than his assignor. 
See Pierce vs. Ackerman, 488 P.2d 1118 (Colo. App. 1971). 
The converse of this statement is the controlling rule 
that pinpoints the error of the trial court and entitles 
plaintiffs to a reversal of the ruling of the trial court 
on the question of the ambiguity of the lease. 
If the assignor had no greater right than the 
assignee, then an assignee would be entitled to compel 
a court of law to construe an ambiguous lease provision 
just as his assignor would have had such right. Plaintiffs 
submit that an assignee steps into the shoes of his assirrnor 
and is entitled to bring an action to compel the proper 
construction of an ambiguous lease. 
Numerous cases recite the rule that the assignee 
"steps into the shoes" of his assignor. See Lundstrom 
--------
vs. Radio Corporation of America, 405 P.2d 339, 341, 
1 <67P.2cl 17 Utah 2d 114 (1965), and PaulJ:sis v~__i:'ow _ _(3_E, ~ 
130, 135, 59 Wash. 2d 204 (1961). By such d stcttement 
-2-
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it cannot be inferred that the assigrce, in any way, losses 
i\ sing] e riglit which wcis previous!; held by the cissignor. 
The pluintiffs' position is supported by the case 
of Mobile Acres, Inc. vs. Kurata, 503 P.2d 889 (Kan. 1973), 
---~------------------------------- -· 
which case is practically identical to the matter now 
before this Court. In ~?l?ll_<:: _ _!'-_s,:_!·cs_, the defendant entered 
into a lease agreement with Messrs. Hill and Webster, 
who subsequently assigned the lease to the plaintiff, 
Mobile Hornes, Inc. 
These arrangements were completely satisfactory 
until an assessment of property taxes against the defendant 
and improvement taxes against the plaintiff gave rise 
to a dispute regarding the meaning of a provision of the 
lease relative to the payment of taxes. The Supreme Court 
of Kansas ruled, as a matter of law, that the lease was 
ambiguous as between the defendant-lessor and the plaintiff-
assignee and the Court remanded the matter to the trial 
court for the development of evidence as to the proper 
construction of the lease. 
As in the Mobil Acres case, the \>ilinegars, as 
assignees of the lease, are entitled to obtain a proper 
construction of their ambiguous lease with the defendant. 
The ambiguity in the lease is not cured by the assignment. 
-"3-
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THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER 
COURT REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR REFORMATION OR 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR PROPER CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE AMBIGUOUS LF.l1SE. 
On page 22 of its brief, the defendant refers 
to the findings of fact of the trial court and states 
that plaintiffs' claim of ambiguity and claim for :::<C'formati", 
are both negated by such findings. Defendant then conclucie' 
its sixth point by citing language of a case relative 
to the standard of review by appellate courts. This Coun, 
however, is free to consider both the facts and the law 
in this matter. 
A suit for reformation is in equity. See Dobbs, 
Remedies, p. 752, and Me~tler vs~Hed]-y, 338 P.2d 489, 
491 (Cal. App. 1959). In equitable proceedings it is 
clear that the Utah Supreme Court sits in review of the 
facts, as well as the law. Salt Lake County vs. Kartchner, 
552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976). 
As to their petition for reformation, plaintiffs' 
submit that there is a mutual mistake of fact. 'fhis asser-
tion is born out by the testimony of the parties. 
Mr. Doxey, who executed the amendment to the lease, 
testified that there was no question about the fact that; 
"the lease was extended and included in that 
extension was the fact that the renewal 
would be extended as well." (R. 148-149) 
M.r. Smith's testimony for the defendant, or rather 
the lack of it, clearly shows that the true intention 
-4-
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of the parties was to establish a three month notice of 
renewal. Mr. Smith's testimony is quoted on page 15 of 
the defendunt's brief and is found at page 255 of the 
record. 
This testimony deals solely with the extension 
of the lease from an eight year to a ten year term. No 
discussion or negotiation as to the renewal provision 
is mentioned. In the absence of any discussion or negotia-
tion as to the time for the giving of the notice of renewal, 
the only meeting of the minds that was obtained by the 
parties on the question of notice is that such notice 
must be given within three months. 
Defendant argues in its brief that because the 
defendant owned the entire adjacent shopping center, it 
was important for the defendant to know about a termination 
of the lease more than two years before the termination was 
to take place. This argument is belied by the fact that, 
on the day that Mr. Smith met with Mr. Doxey to sign the 
amendment to the lease, Mr. Smith offered to Mr. Doxey 
a lease which was prepared by the defendant and which 
contained a notice of renewal provision merely requiring 
a three month notice. Only after specific negotiation 
on the issue of the length of the term was Mr. Doxey able 
to oblain a ten year term. No discussion or negotiation 
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as to the timing of the giving of notice to renew was 
had, and no change was made in the meeting of the minds 
of the parties on the issue of notice. 
The only reasonable conclusion that can be made 
is that both parties, as a matter of mutual mistake, over-
looked the provision relating to notice of renewal, and 
the parties failed to discuss, negotiate, or amend the 
three month notice provision. The notice provision 
should remain, therefore, a provision for a three month 
notice of renewal in order to conform to the understanding 
of the parties. 
At no time did the defendant ask for, or obtain 
a notice provision of more than three months. By a reforma· 
tion of the amendment to the lease, the Court can establis:1 
the true agreement of the parties. 
Separate and distinct from plaintiff~ claim for 
reformation is the fact that the amendment to the lease 
is ambiguous and requires construction by the Court. Whereas 
reformation is an equitable matter, the construction of 
a contract is a matter determined by an action at law. 
In the case now before the court, the plaintiffs are entitled 
to a renewal of the lease for an additional five year 
term on either or both of these theories. 
In considering the construction of the amended 
lease, this court is again not bound by the findings of 
-6-
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the trictl court. 
551 P.2d 932, 933-4 (Colo. App. 1973), the 
Colorado Court of Appeals held thctt 
[t]he construction of a written instrument 
such as the agreement before us is 
a question of law; therefore, we are 
not bound by the finding of the trial 
court in this regard (citation omitted). 
1-lumerous cases cite similar language and support 
the plaintiffs position. Particularly enlightening is 
the recent case of Iskres vs. Owens, 561 P.2d 1218, 1222 
(Alaska 1977). In this case the Supreme Court of Alaska 
construed the provisions of a lease and stated that: 
[i]n analyzing this agreement, our standard 
of appellate review is that which we 
articulated in Day vs. A & G Construction 
Company, Inc., 528 P.2d 440, 448 (Alaska 
1974). There we stated that the inter-
pretation of words is a matter for the 
court, while resolution of a dispute 
is to the surrounding circumstances is 
for the trier of facts. Questions per-
taining to the meaning to be given to 
the words of the contract are to be con-. 
sidered in the same manner as questions 
of law. Consequently, this court, in 
interpreting the words of a contract, 
is not bound by the lower court's views, 
and the "clearly erroneous" standard 
used in reviewing a trial court's 
factual findings is inapplicable. 
After it is determined that a lease agreement 
is ambiguous, and in construing its terms, the appeals 
court generally must review factual circumstances aiding 
its construction of the lease. In such a case the court 
is faced with mixed questions of fact and law and the 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
same standard of review is applicable. The appr~ctls court 
in the case of §~huld_<:~-\7~_._~!ub_!?~_l_c:l_i_l_1_g_, 489 P.2d 122'l, 
1931-2, 15 Ariz. App. 527 (1971), in construing i1 lease 
held that: 
The construction of a written agreement 
involves questions of law, or mixed 
questions of fact and law, neither of 
which are binding on this court on re-
view. (Other citations ommitted, but 
see Waldorf vs. Elliott, 330 P.2d 355, 
357 (1958). 
CONCLUSION 
The ambiguity of the lease provision regarding 
the giving of notice of renewal, is discussed in the first 
point of the Brief of Plaintiffs - Appellants and will 
not be reiterated here. Plaintiffs refer to the foregoing 
arguments and to the argument in their first brief to 
substantiate the fact that the parol evidence relating 
to the execution of the lease amendment, and the practical 
construction of the lease in light of the actions of the 
parties, clearly indicate that the trial court erred in 
failing to grant the plaintiffs a renewal of five years 
on their lease. 
In conjunction with a holding establishing the 
proper construction of the lease or, in the alternative, 
that the plaintiffs are entitled to a reformation of the 
lease to establish the true agreement of the parties, 
-8-
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the plaintiffs are entitled to the other relief sought 
on appeal as set forth in the Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted this K_~ day of November, 
1978. 
~~~~ ~~~A ]) --
~f_.l)~ 
BRUCE LAVAR DIBB 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered, two copies 
of the foregoing to Harry Pugsley, Attorney for the Defendant, 
Suite 1200, South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
this _ _j_~_ day of November, 19 78. 
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